All memory, whether "individual," "collective," or "historical" is memory for something, and this political (in a broad sense) purpose cannot be ignored.
1 Th e cult of a saint is by defi nition a form of a process of memorization. In this kind of religious practice people remember someone whose life was exemplary and in whose lifetime miracles happened (in vita), and/or aft er his or her death (post mortem). Hagiography also constitutes a written genre, and these texts were made in part to conserve the memory of a holy person. As Sofi a Boesch postulates in her manual on sainthood:
Th e hagiographic production appears as a conscious construction of the historical memory of a reality, and the holders of this reality are exceptional persons, extraordinary events, and sacred places.
which the author introduces his analysis with the following theoretical proposition:
I am [. . .] aware of the fact, that the case of Saint Dominic and the Dominicans represents primarily a valid case study concerning the crucial problems of the testimonies, and the modalities of its transmission, and consequently primarily concerns the meanings and forms of the memory.
3
In this current work I will investigate three basic case studies. All of them originated in the thirteenth century, which was the period when the canonization process was formalized as a judicial investigation to memorialize a person as a saint. Th is was approximately the same period during which the inquisitorial procedure against heretics had become a centralized and formalized process. 4 Th e fi rst among my cases is that of Elizabeth of Hungary (or Elizabeth of Th uringia), who represents one of the most famous female saints of the thirteenth century in all of Western Europe. Th e two other examples can be defi ned as special because neither of them represents a "typical" case of sainthood, since Margaret of Hungary was not canonized until the twentieth century. Guglielma of Milan is the third, and although she was venerated, she was never canonized since she and her followers were condemned as heretics.
Th ese three cases share common features in addition to the fact that all of them originated in the thirteenth century. First, in each of them a judicial level process is present-be it canonization or inquisitionwhich is essential for our investigation. It is important to note that although the objectives of canonization and inquisition seem opposed to one another, in the later Middle Ages the two juridical procedures showed structural similarities, and it is not accidental that both were
